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Two recent decisions of the European Court of Justice in the field of criminal 
sanctions have raised a considerable amount of academic interest. Its decision in Case 
C-176/03 Commission v Council (Environmental Legislation Litigation) confirmed 
the Community has the implied power to harmonise criminal laws in relation to other 
Treaty competences. Its earlier decision in Case C-105/03 Pupino established a 
requirement of sympathetic interpretation in relation to Union third pillar framework 
decisions, furthering the legal impact of instruments which on the basis of the Treaty 
on European Union were previously thought to be incapable of supranational legal 
effects. However revolutionary both of these decisions may seem, this paper will 
consider the limitations inherent in both Community and Union legal orders as well as 
these and subsequent cases that mitigate the practical effects of these judgments. It 
will discuss the legal circumstances under which the Communautizing effects of Case 
C-176/03 are applicable and proceed to examine the remaining limitations of Union 
framework decisions in the field of criminal law. Whilst the ECJ has developed the 
notion of Community criminal competence, this paper will demonstrate that its effects 
are primarily upon the vertical division of competences in the Union rather than on 
the criminal law liability of individuals. This is in part because the ECJ has 
maintained in Berlusconi and other recent cases its position that Community 
directives and Union framework decisions are incapable of detrimentally affecting 
defendants’ legal rights, and in part because a number of developments raise 
questions as to the feasibility of directly applicable criminal law Regulations.  1.  Introduction: Community Criminal Law? 
To many Community lawyers, the cases under discussion here will require little 
introduction.  In two seminal judgments examining the ancillary criminal law 
competence of the Community and the legal effects of Union framework decisions in 
the field, the European Court of Justice challenged within the span of six months 
fundamental presumptions about the nature and legal effects of criminal law rules 
emanating from the Union’s institutions in Brussels.  In the Environmental 
Legislation Litigation case,
1 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice 
declared that despite even the Commission’s doubts in the matter,
2 the Community 
had the competence to require criminal penalties in the field of environmental 
protection.  In Pupino,
3 the Grand Chamber declared that Framework Decisions were, 
despite the express denial of direct effect in the Treaty on European Union, capable of 
indirect effect.  The cumulative effect of these judgments is that the Union and the 
Community are capable of not only positively harmonizing criminal law in many 
areas thought outside their competence, but that those rules may be capable of having 
more than a nominal impact on the rights of suspects even without transposition by 
Member States. 
 
Much scholarship in the field has already been undertaken in the two years that have 
passed since the first of these judgments.
4  The purpose of this paper is not primarily 
to reiterate those findings, but to expound some critical perspectives on the 
constitutional limits that are either inherent in these two judgments or have been 
expressed in the Court’s prior case law on the relationship of European-level 
instruments and domestic principles of criminal law.  It may be tempting to raise an 
alarm, signaling the Union’s encroachment on yet another core area of national 
sovereignty as many British publications of record did following the Environmental 
Legislation Litigation.
5  This examination will instead focus on the limits imposed 
upon these developments by the formulae within those judgments, the pre-existing 
corpus of settled doctrines relevant to the field including some general principles of 
Community law and the foundational doctrines of direct effect and sympathetic 
interpretation, and the past case law of the Court in areas where the criminal liabilities 
of individuals are indirectly derived from Community law.  However revolutionary 
both of these judgments may initially seem, there are legal limitations inherent in both 
Community and Union legal orders that mitigate the practical effects of these 
decisions.  Whilst the ECJ has developed the notion that some Community criminal 
competence may exist, this paper will demonstrate that its effects are primarily upon 
                                                 
1 Case C-176/03 Commission v Council. 
2 Commission of the European Communities, Eighth Report of Activities, 1974 point 145.   
Guldenmund, R, and Westeroun van Meeteren, L., ‘Towards and Administrative Sanctioning System in 
the Common Agricultural Policy’ in Harding, C. and Swart, B., Enforcing European Community Rules 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996) pp. 103-123 at p. 107. 
3 Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino. 
4 See for example Tobler, C., ‘Commission v Council, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of September 
13, 2005 nyr’ (2006) 43(3) Common Market Law Review 835-854; Chalmers, D., Editorial: The Court 
of Justice and the Third Pillar (2005) 30(6) European Law Review 773-774;  Fletcher, M., ‘Extending 
“Indirect Effect” to the third pillar: The significance of Pupino’ (2005) 30(6) European Law Review 
862-877; White, S., ‘Harmonisation of criminal law under the first pillar’ (2006) 31(1) European Law 
Review 81-92 and ‘Case C-176/03 and Options for the Development of a Community Criminal Law’ 
(2006) 3-4 EUCrim Forum 93-100; Vervaele, J., ‘The European Community and Harmonisation of the 
Criminal Law Enforcement of Community Policy’ (2006) 3-4 EUCrim Forum 87-93. 
5 For example the London Times reported ‘Europe Wins the Power to Jail British Citizens’ The Times, 
September 14, 2005 p.1. 
  2the vertical division of competences in the Union rather than on the criminal law 
liability of individuals. This is in part because the ECJ has maintained in its case law 
the position that neither Community directives nor Union framework decisions are 
capable of detrimentally affecting defendants’ legal rights, and in part because the 
constitutional Community legal bases for action in most fields preclude the use 
Regulations for the establishment of particular criminal offences or penalties even 
where this is otherwise legally and politically feasible.  
 
2.  The Constitutional framework for European criminal law 
 
2.1 ‘Effectiveness’ as a constitutional benchmark for Community law 
The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community originally expressed few 
of the features that came to distinguish Community law from the body of public 
international law that regulates the relations of sovereign States and was seen by 
many as a framework for international relations rather a binding system of law.   
Although the preamble expressed a desire for an 'ever closer union', it was the Court 
of Justice, rather than the Member States through express Treaty provisions that 





9  From the outset, the Community was capable of creating regulations 
that, without further measures by Member States, became directly applicable in 
national legal systems,
10 supreme even over national constitutional provisions.
11  The 
Court of Justice recognised that '[b]y creating a Community of unlimited duration, 
having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of 
representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming 
from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the 
Community, the Member States have... created a body of law which binds both their 
nationals and themselves.'
12  In the nearly fifty years since the establishment of the 
EEC, the Community has developed a broad set of objectives that extends well 
beyond the core economic freedoms with which the Community is often identified.
13  
Many of these have been appended through subsequent Treaties, but some, such as 
the environmental competence, have originally developed through the Court's creative 
jurisprudence that enabled Member States to establish novel principles ostensibly for 
the purpose of effectively implementing economic policies.
14  Similar reasoning was 
employed in the Environmental Legislation Litigation case to justify why the 
Community has the power to require Member States to employ 'effective, dissuasive 
and proportionate criminal penalties' to protect the environment.
 15   
 
                                                 
6 Costa v ENEL Case 6/64. 
7 Van Gend en Loos Case 26/62. 
8 Von Colson, Case 14/83. 
9 State liability now extends to judicial decisions contrary to Community law: Kobler Case C-224/01. 
10 Article 189 EEC Treaty, now Article 249 EC. 
11 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft Case 11/70. 
12 Costa v ENEL Case 6/64 paragraph 3. 
13 In particular, Articles 2 and 3 EC. 
14 Commission v Italy, Case 91/79; ADBHU Case 240/83. Now Article 3(1)(l)TEC. 
15 Commission v Council, Case C-176/03 paragraph 48. ‘Effective, dissuasive, and proportionate’ has a 
long-standing history in case law; the innovation in C-176/03 was the insertion of ‘criminal’ into the 
formula. 
  32.2 Legal bases and the common market 
It might be inferred that the EC Treaty did not confer competence on matters relating 
to the positive harmonisation of criminal law.  The idea of a European federal 
criminal law in the context of the European Community is a contentious proposition 
that has been approached by many Member States with caution if not outright 
rejection.  Their timidity is illustrated by numerous express references in the Treaties 
attempting to restrict within the supranational corpus of EC law the scope of powers 
evolved from Member States relating to criminal law.  The Court has consistently 
noted that ‘as a general rule neither criminal law nor criminal procedure fall within 
Community competence.’
16  The Community competences enumerated in article 3(1) 
EC Treaty are for the most part clearly linked to the Article 2 task of ‘establishing a 
common market’.  Many of the potentially more expansive ‘activities of the 
Community’, including the approximation of laws, are limited to the extent to which 
they are required for the ‘functioning of the common market.’
17  Article 94 requires 
approximating measures to ‘directly affect the establishment or functioning of the 
common market.’  Article 95 refers to the objective of ‘establishment and functioning 
of the common market’ and requires a genuine objective of improving the 
preconditions of the internal market.
18  Article 308, providing for the creation of 
further powers necessary to ‘attain, in the course of the operation of the common 
market, one of the objectives of the Community’ again requires a tie to the objectives 
of the community that are related to the operation of the common market and can only 
be invoked where no other Treaty legal base would suffice.  Whenever one of these 
general legal bases is cited, there must be a common market dimension to any 
approximation of criminal laws under the EC Treaty.  
 
2.3 Crime in the EC Treaty 
There is sufficient textual evidence to question whether the approximation of criminal 
law was intended to fall within the EC Treaty at all.  When crime is mentioned in the 
Community treaty, it is to expressly preclude Community criminal competence.   In 
relation to visa, asylum and immigration policy, originally an area of 
intergovernmental Union cooperation, Article 61(a) EC precludes the extension of 
Community competence to measures to prevent and combat crime in relation to 
external border controls, asylum, and immigration.  Article 61(e) expressly reserves 
‘measures in the field of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters aimed at 
a high level of security by preventing and combating crime within the Union’ to the 
Union.  In the field of customs co-operation, the EC Treaty excludes measures 
concerning ‘the application of national criminal law or the national administration of 
justice’
19.  Such measures are also excluded from the community competence to fight 
fraud against its institutions.
20  The framers of the treaty may have intended to 
exclude Community competence in relation to criminal law in the areas where it may 
otherwise conceivably become contested for the reason that it may be necessary for 
the effectiveness of the Community legal order.  There is no universal express State 
reservation of criminal competence in the Treaty.  However, the limitation of relevant 
provisions to the common market coupled with express reservations in areas that 
                                                 
16 Case 203/80 Casati paragraph 27; case C-226/97 Lemmens paragraph 19.  Commission v Council 
case C-176/03 paragraph 47. 
17 Article 3(1)(h) approximation of the laws of Member States. 
18 Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising Directive paragraphs 83-84. 
19 Article 135 EC. 
20 Article 280(4) EC. 
  4extend beyond market liberalisation lead the casual observer to conclude that the 
Community is intended to have no power to harmonise criminal law.  Indeed, in 
secondary legislation relating to the internal market, including all relevant legislation 
in areas where the Community has powers of enforcement, express reference is made 
to preclude any notion of criminal law powers being exercised.
21  This can be read as 
a requirement for political agreement in that an express limit in the context of 
Community law was required to obtain the passage of that secondary legislation.   
 
2.4 Criminal law in the Treaty on European Union 
Turning to the Treaty on European Union, the objectives of the Union relevant to 
criminal law are in relation to providing a ‘high level of safety within the area of 
freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member 
States in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters’.
22 The 
‘approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal matters in the Member 
States,’
23 envisages ‘progressively adopting measures establishing minimum rules 
relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the fields of 
organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking’.
24  The approximation of rules 
on criminal matters prevents and combats ‘crime, organised or otherwise’.  Article 29 
lists ‘terrorism, trafficking in persons, offences against children, illicit drug trafficking 
and illicit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud’ as particular examples but does not 
expressly preclude the inclusion of others.  It is far from clear that offences against  
children necessarily involve an inter-state element, dismissing any notion that the area 
of freedom, security and justice must be directly linked to the common market.   
However, the methods of achieving the area of freedom, security and justice, 
prescribed as ‘preventing and combating crime’ are further specified in Article 29.  
Simply any subjectively suitable method will not suffice; closer cooperation between 
the executive authorities of Member States, judicial authorities and Eurojust are 
governed ‘in accordance with the provisions of Articles 30 and 32’.  Crucially, the 
third form of action, approximation ‘of rules on criminal matters’, is governed by 
article 31(1)(e), which lays down rules and limits to the competence of the Union to 
approximate rules on criminal matters.  According to Article 31(1), ‘Common action 
on judicial co-operation in criminal matters shall include… (e) progressively adopting 
measures establishing minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal 
acts and to penalties in the fields of organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug 
trafficking’.  The form of words in Article 31 is somewhat unfortunate in that it is 
drafted in a permissive tone, rather than as the limiting provision envisaged by article 
29.  The inclusive ‘shall include’ of the Treaty is hardly a limiting provision, as would 
be for example ‘shall only include’.  If express conferral was to be required in the 
field, Article 31(1)(e) could be read in at least two substantially different ways.  One, 
more restrictive interpretation, calls for the consideration of ‘in the fields of organised 
crime, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking’ as a limiting provision applicable to both 
‘minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties’.  
The other, liberal interpretation, severs ‘minimum rules relating to the constituent 
elements of criminal acts’ and the penalties in limited fields.  In the first example, 
                                                 
21 For example, council Regulation 17/62 on the enforcement of competition law; Directive 6/2003 on  
market abuse refers to purely administrative sanctions (article 14).  Regulation 1/2003 replicates the 
sentiments of Regulation 17/62. 
22 Article 29 TEU. 
23 Article 29 TEU. 
24 Article 31(1)(e) TEU. 
  5Union powers are limited to three areas which are recognised to pose particular 
problems within an internal market characterised by the free movement of the factors 
of production, but the restricted movement of law enforcement authorities and 
criminal laws.  The second, liberal interpretation, permits Union action in penal policy 
only in so far as it is related to the three listed areas but leaves unfettered an expansive 
power to enact minimum rules related to the ‘constituent elements of criminal acts’.  
Some Union legislation suggests that neither interpretation of the Treaty limits is 
observed, and that the list is non-exhaustive.
25  In any case, the distinction now seems 
somewhat academic considering the possibility of powers implied by the EC Treaty.   
 
2.5 Legal distinctions between Union and Community  
In the field of civil law rules, there is a legal significance to the distinction between 
the Community and Union. Beyond the first pillar, the Union has few of the 
mechanisms of adjudication available within the Community and therefore there is 
little risk that corresponding legislation with relevance to criminal law in the context 
of the Union is in itself binding, 'hard' law.
26  Substantive developments in the field of 
criminal law were for the most part consigned to this intergovernmental third 'pillar' 
of the European Union, currently referred to as the title on Police and Judicial Co-
operation in Criminal Matters.
27  The Court of Justice generally only has jurisdiction 
to give rulings on the validity and interpretation of Union legal instruments where a 
Member State accepts the Court's jurisdiction.
28  Secondly, many of the doctrines that 
have extended the power of Community rules in the past 50 years of economic 
integration are inapplicable to Union law, having been omitted in or expressly 
excluded by the Treaty on European Union.
29  These limits result in the weaker 
independent legal standing of policies formulated under the aegis of the Union. Rules 
created under the first, Community pillar could in principle have created enforceable 
rights in national courts.  Without the active implementation and execution of Union 
policies by Member States, the legal standing of individuals seemed largely 
unaffected.   
 
3.  The Environmental Legislation Litigation and Pupino cases 
 
3.1 Environmental Legislation Litigation and Pupino 
The Environmental Legislation Litigation case involved an action for the annulment 
of Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003 on the protection of 
the environment through criminal law on the basis that it encroached on the 
Community’s competence to protect the environment under Articles 174-176 EC.   
                                                 
25 See for example Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA of 12 July 2005 to strengthen the 
criminal-law framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution, challenged in C-
440/05 (awaiting the Advocate General’s opinion as of May 9, 2007). 
26 The Environmental Legislation Litigation case was heard on the basis of an implied jurisdiction in 
the EC Treaty. 
27 Formely known as 'Justice and Home Affairs', the current moniker reflects the transfer of powers in 
the fields of visas, asylum, immigration and other measures concerned with securing the free 
movement of persons to the supranational EC pillar. 
28 TEU Articles 35(1), (2) and (3). This 'soft law' character of Union instruments is further complicated 
by the limited jurisdiction of the ECJ in relation to third pillar secondary legislation.  On the (limited) 
effects of communitising Title IV EU, see Nascimbene, B, 'Community Courts in the Area of Judicial 
Cooperation'  (2005) 54 ICLQ 489-497. 
29 TEU Article 34(2)(b) and (c), excluding the direct effects of framework decisions and decisions, the 
two instruments declared 'binding'. 
  6The substance of the Framework Decision was similar to a previous proposal by the 
Commission on a Directive that, as the framework decision, would require Member 
States to establish criminal penalties in relation to defined offences.
30  I n  t h e  
Environmental Legislation Litigation case, the Court of Justice found that despite the 
general rule derived from its case law that ‘neither criminal law nor the rules of 
criminal procedure fall within the Community’s competence,
31 the Community was 
nevertheless empowered to take ‘measures which relate to the criminal law of the 
Member States which it considers necessary in order to ensure that the rules which it 
lays down on environmental protection are fully effective’.
32  The EC Treaty was 
hierarchically superior to the EU Treaty, and therefore if a competence could be 
implied under the EC Treaty, rules derived from the EU Treaty could not affect the 
limits or exercise of that competence.
33  In this case, the Court considered the purpose 
to be the protection of the Environment, a Community competence, rather than the 
harmonisation of criminal law which without such a link remains outside Community 
competence.
34  The one limit to the ancillary Community criminal competence 
recognised by the Commission, namely that the Union treaty is 'the appropriate legal 
basis for the provisions… which deal with jurisdiction, extradition and prosecutions 
of persons who have committed offences,'
35 relies on provisions within the Treaty on 
European Union.  It may therefore also be subject to challenge on the same basis as 
the Framework Decision in the Environmental Legislation Litigation if it can be 
shown that these, too are necessary facets of effective Community law. 
 
In the somewhat less well-known case of Pupino, the Court of Justice was invited to 
consider the effects that an unimplemented Framework Decision on the standing of 
victims in criminal proceedings
36 could have on the interpretation of domestic 
criminal procedural rules.  The relevant domestic legislation allowed testimony from 
minors to be obtained under special evidentiary rules in the case of sexual offences, 
but made no special dispensation for other types of vulnerable victims.
37  However, 
the framework decision applied irrespective of the types of offence, having instead 
been drafted to protect ‘particularly vulnerable’ victims,
38 and required Member 
States to obtain testimony from victims ‘where there is a need to protect victims – 
particularly those most vulnerable – from the effects of giving evidence in open 
court… by any appropriate means compatible with its basic legal principles’.
39  The 
offences in question were not sexual offences, thereby precluding the domestic 
procedural exception from the rule requiring adversarial proceedings.  In its question, 
the national court asked whether the Framework Decision required it to authorise 
young children to give testimony in circumstances that enabled the level of protection 
                                                 
30 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law COM(2001) 139 of 13 March 2001; amended proposal 
COOM(2002) 544. 
31 Paragraph 47, citing Case 203/80 Casati paragraph 27 and Case C-226/97 Lemmens paragraph 19. 
32 Paragraph 48. 
33 Paragraphs 38-39. 
34 Paragraph 51. 
35 Environmental Legislation Litigation paragraph 23. 
36 Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in 
criminal proceedings. 
37 Paragraphs 10 and 11 Case C-105/03.   
38 Article 2 Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA. 
39 Article 8(4) Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA. 
  7required by the Framework Decision.
40  In its answer, the Court stated that despite the 
general language used,
41 the Framework Decision required a special procedure to be 
used to protect vulnerable victims.
42  After some discussion of the protections 
required for defendants, it concluded nevertheless that the Framework Decision 
required the national court to be able to ‘authorise young children who… claim to 
have been victims of maltreatment, to give their testimony in accordance with 
arrangements allowing those children to be guaranteed an appropriate level of 
protection, for example outside the trial and before it takes place.’
43  Given the 
apparent conflict between the rights of the defendant and the requirements of the 
Framework Decision, the court shrewdly left the balancing exercise to the national 
authorities. 
 
These cases make two significant inroads into the general rule that the legal 
instruments of the Member States, rather than the Union, regulate the criminal 
liability of individuals.  The Environmental Legislation Litigation makes clear that the 
Community is despite its lack of express criminal competence capable of defining 
criminal offences and requiring ‘necessary, dissuasive and proportionate criminal 
penalties’ for those offences.  Although the case involved the clash between a 
directive and framework decision, there may be instances, detailed below, where this 
could be effected by way of a directly applicable regulation.  Where the Union acts by 
way of framework decisions, the Court of Justice has required in Pupino Member 
States to interpret their pre-existing rules of procedure in accordance with framework 
decisions.  By analogy, the same requirement may be placed on directives creating 
criminal law or procedural obligations.
44
 
3.2 Later cases involving C-176/03 
These two cases raise a number of foundational questions, not least of which are the 
relationship of interpretative requirements and the rights of defendants and the extent 
of the substantive Treaty competences to which the Community criminal law powers 
may be applied.  Many of these questions will form the subject matter of future 
litigation before the Court.  At the time of writing,
45 only a handful of subsequent 
judgments or opinions cite either case.  Few of these tackle the more foundational 
questions; where the cases have been cited as authority, they are often used to support 
conclusions other than the fundamental propositions of law detailed above.  The 
Environmental Legislation Litigation case has thus far been relied by the European 
Court of Justice to reiterate the importance of Article 6 EC within the Treaty 
framework,
46 and that the choice of a legal basis must ‘be based on objective factors 
which are amenable to judicial review and include in particular the aim and content of 
the measure’.
47  The Court of First Instance has relied upon the case to review the 
                                                 
40 Paragraph 50. 
41 Paragraph 54. 
42 Paragraph 56. 
43 Paragraph 61. 
44 Case C-369/04 Hutchison 3G UK Ltd and Others v HM Commissioners of Customs & Excise, point 
150 of the Opinion of AG Kokott; Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld footnote 25 to point 43 of 
the Opinion of AG Kokott. 
45 As of May 7, 2007. 
46 Case C-320/03 Commission v Austria paragraph 72 (ECJ, Grand Chamber); Case C-86/03 Greece v 
Commission paragraph 96(ECJ, 1
st Chamber).  
47 Case C-178/03 Commission v Parliament and Council paragraph 41 (ECJ, 2
nd Chamber) and Case C-
94/03 Commission v Council paragraph 34, both referring to Case C-176/03 Paragraph 45.  See also 
  8compatibility of an EU instrument with the EC Treaty notwithstanding the lack of an 
express declaration of jurisdiction by the Member State in question.
48  Advocates 
General have made more use of the case in their opinions.  The legal basis formula in 
paragraph 45 of the case has also been cited by AG Léger in the PNR Agreement 
case.
49  Advocate General Colomer, the Advocate General in the Environmental 
Legislation Litigation case, has relied on the case to reiterate that the proper legal 
basis for environmental protection measures is within the EC Treaty.
50 Advocate 
General Geelhoed has relied on paragraph 42 of the case, which restates the 
embedded environmental protection requirements of Article 6 EC in all other 
Community policy fields.
51  Of somewhat greater interest are Advocate General 
Colomer’s opinion in Placanica and the application for annulment of the Ship-Source 
pollution Framework Decision in Case C-440/05.  In his opinion in Placanica, AG 
Colomer refers to point 48 of his opinion in C-176/03, restating that the Member 
State, rather than the European institutions, are ‘in the best position to assess the 
feasibility, appropriateness and effectiveness of a punitive response’ to breaches of 
Community rules.
52  Whilst the Ship-Source Pollution Framework Decision case
53 
has yet to reach the Advocate General, this case holds some potential for the clearer 
delimitation of the Community’s ancillary criminal competences as it involves 
another annulment action of a criminal law environmental protection measure with an 
EU legal basis.
54  This application will be considered in greater detail below. 
 
3.3 Later Cases Involving C-105/03 
Most subsequent references to Pupino are of modest constitutional significance.  The 
Court of Justice has relied on Pupino to restate the limits of the Court’s Jurisdiction in 
relation to Title VI EU
55 and the conditions of exercising Article 234 jurisdiction 
where a Member State has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to a Union 
instrument.
56  The Court of First Instance has relied on Pupino to note the existence 
                                                                                                                                            
AG Colomer’s opinion of 30. May 2006 in Case C-486/04, Commission v Italy, referring in point 38 to 
a substantially similar point 59 in his opinion in C-176/03. 
48 Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council paragraph 59, referring to 
C-176/03 paragraph 39. 
49 Joined Cases C-317 and 318/04 Parliament v Council (PNR Agreement), Opinion of AG Léger of 
22. November 2005, footnote 62 to point 126. 
50 Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld VZ v Leden van de Ministerraad, Opinion of AG Colomer 
of 12. September 2006, footnote 86 to point 85. 
51 Case C-161/04 Austria v Parliament and Council, Opinion of AG Geelhoed of 26 January 2006, 
footnote 21 to point 44. 
52 Joined Cases C-338/04 et seq., Procuratore della Repubblica v Massimiliano Placanica, Christian 
Palazzese and Angelo Sorrichio, Opinion of AG Colomer of 16. May 2006, footnote 104 to point 135, 
referring to point 48 of his opinion in Case C-176/03. 
53 Case C-440/05, Commission v Council (Ship Source Pollution Framework Decision), Application of 
8. December 2005, OJ C 22, 28.01.2006, p. 10.  Assuming a time-frame comparable to C-176/03, an 
opinion might be expected around January 2008, with a judgment falling on either side of summer the 
judicial vacation in 2008. 
54 Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA of 12 July 2005 to strengthen the criminal-law 
framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution. 
55 Case C-354/04 P, Gestoras pro Aministía and others v Council (ECJ Grand Chamber) paragraph 50 
and Case C-355/04 P, Segi and others v Council paragraph 50, both referring to paragraph 35 Case C-
105/03. 
56 Case C-150/05 Van Straaten v Netherlands and Italy (ECJ First Chamber) paragraph 31 and Case C-
467/04 Criminal Proceedings against Gasparini and others, paragraph 41, both referring to paragraph 
28 Case C-105/03. 
  9of an obligation of loyal cooperation within Title VI EU.
57  In Advocaten voor de 
Wereld,  AG Colomer has referred to Pupino  as a ‘suitable starting point’ to the 
analysis of third pillar instruments’ relationships with Community law, in particular 
the European Arrest Warrant.
58  In i21 Germany, he made a passing reference to the 
Pupino requirement of sympathetic interpretation
59 in coming to the conclusion that 
the sympathetic interpretation of Directive 97/13/EC on Telecommunications 
licencing required a Member State to reopen an assessment where a legal challenge to 
its validity was time-barred.
60  O f  m o r e  i n t e r e s t  a r e AG Kokott’s opinions in 
Hutchinson 3G and Adeneler and the Court’s judgment in Adeneler. In Hutchinson 
3G, AG Kokott notes that paragraph 47 of Pupino, namely the lack of an obligation to 
interpret national law contra legem in line with Union framework decisions, also 
applies to directives.
61  In her opinion to Adeneler, she equates the requirement of 
sympathetic interpretation between framework decisions and directives.
62  I n  
Adeneler, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice following AG Kokott revisited 
in some detail the limits to the obligation of sympathetic interpretation of framework 
decisions in paragraphs 44 and 47 of Pupino.
63  These are both discussed below in 
greater detail. 
 
4.  Limits to individual criminal liability under European instruments 
Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that other than trials 
for offences that are ‘criminal according to the general principles of law recognised 
by civilised nations’,
64 no one should be held guilty of an offence ‘which did not 
constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time it was 
committed’.
65  The principle of legality has been applied in a series of cases by the 
European Court of Justice as a general principle of Community law,
66 and applies 
mutatis mutandis to criminal obligations created by framework decisions.
67  It can be 
seen to guide the Court’s views as to the direct effect and the sympathetic 
interpretation of criminal law rules under both first and third pillar instruments. 
 
4.1 The Scope of Community criminal competence
68
                                                 
57 Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council paragraph 123, referring 
to C-105/03 paragraph 42.  See also the footnote 54 to point 106 of the Opinion of Advocate General 
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  10The constitutional significance of the Environmental Legislation Litigation judgment 
is difficult to overstate.  However, as with many pronouncements of similar gravity, 
its doctrinal developments are founded on a number of significant caveats.  In its 
judgment, the Grand Chamber recognised that in certain circumstances, a Community 
power to take ‘measures which relate to the criminal law of the Member States which 
[the Community legislature] considers necessary in order to ensure that the rules 
which it lays down on environmental protection are fully effective.‘
69  A pre-requisite 
of this is that the ‘application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal 
penalties by the competent national authorities’ must be ‘an essential measure for 
combating serious environmental offences’.
70  The strict sectoral scope of the 
judgment is limited to environmental offences.
71  Since the subsequent dispute over 
the  Ship-Source Pollution case involves a conflict between Union criminal 
competence and the Community environmental competence, it is not thought likely 
that the Court will expressly consider other sectors in its forthcoming judgment in C-
440/05  except perhaps in so far as a legal base of the Ship-Source Pollution 
Framework Decision
72 is also found within the transport sector.  However, in its 
communication of November 24, 2005 and subsequent practice, the Commission has 
interpreted the expansion of its powers and discretion broadly.
73  According to the 
Commission, Community powers to require criminal penalties may be invoked in any 
EC Treaty policy sector that requires in the opinion of the Commission criminal 
penalties to ensure the effectiveness of those policies.
74  This included the adoption of 
a proposal on the basis of Article 95
75 alone and even more controversially, Article 
280(4) which itself precludes measures related to the application of national criminal 
law.
76  A sectoral criminal law power could in principle be implied in other areas, a 
case could be made that this is limited to those areas of Community policy that in the 
Court’s words are ‘one of the essential objectives of the Community’.
77  It will be 
recalled that Article 6 is indeed special in that it requires all Community policies 
within the Treaty framework to be evaluated from the perspective of environmental 
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  11protection.  Whilst there are some other foundational themes which recur within the 
Treaty such as the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality in 
Article 12, no other provision expressly requires a similar impact assessment within 
the general legislative procedure relevant to another sector.  A case could be made by 
those wishing to restrict Community criminal law powers that this is a foundational 
requirement of ancillary criminal law competence which is therefore limited 
exclusively to environmental protection objectives.  Finally, the invocation of 
Community criminal law competence requires a demonstrated necessity for such 
action.
78  The reference in the Court’s judgment only refers to the perception of such 
a necessity by the Community legislature.  This has in practice translated into 
extensive background documentation in relation to the first directive proposal 
formulated after the case.  On the same date that the Commission published that 
proposal, it also published an extensive working paper that detailed, inter alia, an 
empirical case for Community-level criminal measures based on the lack of effect and 
fragmentary content of relevant national rules.
79
 
4.2. Proposed Directives with criminal law implications 
Whatever the Commission’s view as to the extent of its powers, only five directive 
proposals with explicit criminal law elements have ever been transmitted to the 
European Parliament for consideration.  Of these, three were submitted prior to the 
Court’s judgment.  The first led to the Environmental Legislation Litigation case,
  80 
the second was never discussed by Council owing to considerable opposition amongst 
Member States, and the third is now under dispute in a pending case. The last two 
took into account the effects of the Environmental Legislation Litigation case.
81 The 
Commission’s original proposal for a directive establishing criminal penalties for 
defined environmental offences was hijacked by the Council, which reincorporated its 
substance into the framework decision contested in case C-176/03. The Directive on 
infringements and penalties for Ship-Source Pollution
82 fared better, in part because it 
left to Member States the discretion of whether to criminalise those infringements.
83  
It also relied on the so-called dual text approach where the obligation to impose 
penalties is embedded within a directive but the criminal law elements are separated 
into a framework decision.
84  Following the judgment in C-176/03, the Commission 
has initiated proceedings in Case C-440/05 to annul the framework decision on the 
grounds that its contents are properly within the competence of the Community and 
therefore ought to be embedded into a directive.
85  The proposed directive on the 
protection of the financial interests of the Community, transmitted in 2001, would 
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  12have harmonised the definitions of certain offences
86 and required the Member States 
‘take the necessary measures to transpose the provisions of this Chapter into their 
national criminal law in such a way that the conduct referred to therein constitutes 
criminal offences’.
87  The proposal expressly required criminal penalties
88 and 
custodial sentences in the case of ‘serious fraud’
89 but did not specify the exact 
penalties required.  It was never discussed by the Council and was abandoned before 
2002.  The Proposal for a Directive on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights
90 has been discussed at the JHA Council
91 
and has recently received a first reading in the EP.
92  The EP and Commission concur 
on the competence of the Community to criminalise offences and harmonise penalties, 
but differ as to the scope of the directive
93 and the criminalisation of mere attempts.
94  
The proposal, amended after C-176/03
95 requires Member States to criminalise 
intentional infringements of intellectual property rights
96 and penalties including 
custodial penalties,
97 but leaves the specific penalties to the discretion of Member 
States except for a provision laying down guidelines for minimum maximum 
custodial penalties where the offence is committed under the certain aggravating 
circumstances.
98  Finally, the Commission has transmitted a proposal or a directive 
similar to the framework decision in the Environmental Legislation Litigation.
99  This 
is likely to reinvigorate the debate as to the precise extent of the Community criminal 
power, because it both defines offences and, crucially, lays down detailed sentencing 
guidelines in respect of many of those offences.
100  This is a key question at the heart 
of the competence debate, because whilst the Court has recognised the Community’s 
power to require Member States to enact specified criminal offences and take 
‘measures which relate to the criminal law of the Member States which [the 
Community] considers necessary in order to ensure that the rules… on environmental 
protection are fully effective’,
101 it stressed that the framework decision that infringed 
on the Community’s competence only defined conduct as criminal, but left ‘to the 
Member States the choice of the criminal penalties to apply’ so long as these fit the 
tripartite test of effectiveness, dissuasiveness and proportionality.
102  This is not the 
case with the 2007 proposal, which specifies in some detail the framework for 
criminal law sanctions.  The Court has been presented with an opportunity to review 
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  13in detail its position in the pending Ship-Source Pollution Framework Decision 
case,
103 which involves a dual text system similar to that in the proposed directive on 
environmental crime.  Advocate General Colomer has recently repeated the relevant 
point of his opinion in the Environmental Legislation Litigation case in the recent 
opinion in Placanica, where he notes that Member States, rather than European 
institutions, are ‘in the best position to assess the feasibility, appropriateness and 
effectiveness of a punitive response’.
104  If the Court chooses this route of analysis 
and follows it to its logical conclusion, namely that the precise determination of 
criminal penalties must be an exclusively national competence, this may preclude the 
use of Regulations in those fields where the Community might otherwise be 
competent to do so. 
 
4.3 Direct effect 
In the field of criminal law, whether a measure falls within Union or Community 
competence is not as of yet material from the point of view of its subjects.  Criminal 
law is, by definition, a system designed to penalise the infractions of individuals 
against state authority.  A power to create and enforce independent rules of criminal 
law in the form of directives would present the Community with a clear break from 
historical boundaries drawn by the Court of Justice to the doctrines of direct effect 
and primacy.
105  In the terminology of ECJ doctrine, this could be described as an 
extreme form of horisontal direct effect.  Community rules can generally be enforced 
against Member States, but in the absence of national law implementing those 
provisions, they are rarely capable of restricting the rights of individuals in national 
legal systems.
106  Under the doctrine of direct effect, individuals can rely on 
Community provisions against Member States, but except in the exceptional cases of 
some Treaty rules
107 and one isolated case where the Court considered a directive to 
enunciate ‘general principles of Community law’,
108 of are unable to rely directly on 
Community law to the detriment of other individuals.
109  In its leading cases on the 
question, the Court derived this limit from the Treaty text itself, which states that 
directives are binding on Member States (but not individuals).
110  Unsurprisingly, 
Member States are unable to rely on unimplemented EC rules to the detriment of their 
citizens.
111  When a Member State fails to fulfill its obligations, it can be held liable 
in damages under the doctrine of state liability.  Since state liability is inapplicable to 
individuals, the punitive aspects of Community criminal law are effective only against 
individuals where Member States implement Community policies in the national legal 
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  14system.  As a system for regulating the behaviour of individuals, there are few areas 
outside competition law where the sanctions provided by Community law are 
effective without Member State compliance, either by way of enforcement or the 
transposition of EC rules into national legal systems.
112  The Treaty on European 
Union recognises explicitly that framework decisions are incapable of direct effect.
113  
Whilst the Court of Justice has noted the possibility of state liability where those 
obligations are not adhered to,
114 the picture in relation to current and proposed 
measures in the form of directives or framework decisions is therefore 
overwhelmingly one of a system that restricts the discretion of Member States, but 
fails to effectively penalise individuals without the intervention of those Member 
States.  
 
4.4 Sympathetic interpretation 
The principle of loyal cooperation in Article 10 EC has often been used to explain the 
requirement of sympathetic interpretation.  While this is well established in the field 
of Community internal market law, no similar principle is enunciated in the Treaty on 
European Union.  In Pupino, the ECJ found that despite the lack of an this type of 
express Treaty article establishing a principle of loyal cooperation within the Union 
legal framework, it not only existed within the Union’s third pillar framework,
115 but 
required Member States’ judicial authorities to interpret domestic criminal and 
procedural law in line with the requirements of that principle.  This is potentially at 
odds with the principle of legality and analogous rules that have developed in relation 
to directives.  In Pupino, the Court noted three guiding principles relevant to the 
sympathetic interpretation of Community and Union criminal law measures.  Firstly, 
the obligation of sympathetic interpretation ‘is limited by general principles of law, 
particularly those of legal certainty and non-retroactivity’.
116  This precludes a 
European-level obligation in either a directive or a framework decision from ‘leading 
to the criminal liability of persons who contravene [those provisions] being 
determined or aggravated on the basis of [those instruments] alone, independently of 
an implementing law.’.
117  Secondly, the national court’s obligation ‘ceases when the 
[provision of national law] cannot receive an application which would lead to a result 
compatible with [a framework decision or directive and can not require] an 
interpretation of national law contra legem.’
118  Finally, whether such an 
interpretation can be achieved given these rules is for the national court.
119  I n  
Adeneler, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice reiterated its brief observations 
in Pupino on the limits of the requirement for sympathetic interpretation.
120  After 
noting the existence of that requirement to ‘ensure the full effectiveness of 
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  15Community law’
121 and the general requirements of legal certainty and non-
retroactivity,
122 it stated that national courts must ‘do whatever lies within their 
jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying 
the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law’ when interpreting national 
law in conformity with Union instruments.
123  Two observations arise from these 
requirements.  The first is that the factual assessment of whether a given method of 
interpretation is contrary to the fundamental rights of defendants in criminal 
proceedings is left to the Member States.  In Pupino, the Court suggested that the 
relevant national procedural regulations could be extended to categories of victims 
recognised as vulnerable under its interpretation of the framework decision, but not 
under national law.
124  This seems to border on an interpretation contra legem and 
calls into question whether the Court of Justice can be trusted to interpret the 
compatibility of Union law with fundamental rights as the European Court of Human 
Rights has recently suggested,
125 but nevertheless signals the great degree of latitude 
available to national courts under the requirements of sympathetic interpretation.  One 
wonders whether a similar margin of appreciation would be extended where the 
framework decision seeks to provide positive rights.
126  Secondly, in Pupino, the 
Court also suggested that it was prepared to uphold a rather formalistic delimitation 
between criminal law and criminal procedure to the detriment of defendants.  The 
rights of defendants were to be protected in so far as the principle of legality applied 
to the former, but were not according to the Court under assault where the rules 
applied merely to ‘the conduct of proceedings and the means of taking evidence’.
127  
Amending the rules of criminal procedure by way of a sympathetic interpretation in 
accordance with a framework decision was not deemed to affect the rights of the 
defendant.  However, taking this analytical framework to one logical extreme, it could 
be argued on this basis that the amendment or repeal of a statute of limitations on the 
basis of a Union rule could also constitute a procedural, rather than a substantive 
change to the detriment of the defendant.
128  Whilst the greater elaboration of this is 
beyond the scope of this paper,
129 it is very difficult to accept that this does not 
materially affect defendants’ rights, or pose the possibility of an infringement of the 
relevant ECHR rules on the fairness of the criminal process despite rulings of the 
European Court of Human Rights that draw analogous distinctions
130 particularly 
since the application of the Convention principles is dependent not on the criminal 
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  16law designation of those rules but on their punitive nature.  At the very least, this 
could invite litigation raising the spectre of primacy in the EU pillars where a 
framework decision requires a sympathetic interpretation that could be seen as 
contrary to domestic procedural rights but does not fall within the Court’s 
demonstrably restrictive notion of what constitutes contra legem.  In conclusion, the 
broad, principled requirement that neither directives nor framework decisions may in 
themselves ‘determine or aggravate’ an individual’s liability under criminal law
131 
must be taken with the substantial caveat that the substantive scope of an individual’s 
criminal law liability is interpreted rather strictly by the European Court of Justice. 
 
4.4 Regulations: Prospects for directly applicable Community criminal laws 
The expansion of positive Community criminal law powers to the first pillar and the 
possible limits of the Environmental Legislation Litigation and Pupino cases raise the 
question of whether the Community is competent to embed criminal law obligations 
into directly applicable Regulations rather than other secondary instruments that in a 
criminal context depend upon Member State implementing measures.  If it is accepted 
that the Community competence extends beyond the scope of the Article 6 integrated 
environmental protection objective, it could be argued that some fields of exclusive 
Community competence and others where the Community has a lead regulatory role 
may necessitate the introduction of criminal penalties.  For example, specified 
penalties and defined offences are already derived from Regulations, albeit in a ‘civil’ 
or ‘administrative’ form, in the fields of fisheries, agriculture and competition law.  
As the Environmental Legislation Litigation judgment clarifies, the express denial of 
the criminal law nature of those penalties is not derived from Treaty principles but is 
inserted into the Community measures for other reasons.
132  The Court of Justice has 
had the opportunity to declare unequivocally that Regulations establishing 
Community criminal obligations are constitutionally suspect.  It has failed to do so, 
and instead formulated its judgment in a way which enables this subsequent to the 
judgment in C-176/03.  In Criminal proceedings against X
133, the Court considered a 
regulation insufficient without national implementing measures to aggravate or 
determine the liability of persons contravening regulations.  However, in X, the 
regulation called for national measures establishing penalties and therefore failed the 
test for direct effect.
134  Whilst recognising the rights of individuals in criminal 
matters, the ECJ noted that the regulation in question
135 was dependent on national 
implementing measures, '…thereby making it possible to transpose… the Court's 
reasoning in respect of directives'.  It follows that later judgments, by implication, 
may diverge on their conclusions if the Court is presented with a regulation that both 
defines offences and specifies penalties and fails to require implementing measures by 
Member States.  Two practical counterclaims might be made here.  The first is that 
while the Court has recognised the margin of appreciation available to the Community 
legislature in determining the appropriate response to infringements, the promulgation 
of a Regulation will require broad political agreement within the Council that in 
practice represents Member State views.  To date no proposal for a directive which 
specifies offences and penalties to a level of detail that might all other things being 
equal entail direct effect has survived that legislative process.  The only current 
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  17proposal that even departs from the dual text practice where specific criminal offences 
and penalties have been removed from the Community instrument in favour of a sister 
Framework Decision has not yet been considered by either the European Parliament 
or by the Council.  The second is that even if such a proposal survived codecision, it 
would be open to the Court to review the direct applicability of Community criminal 
law instruments from the point of view of the principle of legality or other general 
principles of Community law.  In sum, whilst the Court’s judgment in X leaves open 
in principle the possibility of directly applicable criminal law regulations in support of 
other substantive Community policies, other considerations may prevent the exercise 
of this possibility in practice.  It is interesting to note in this respect that the draft 
Constitutional Treaty provided for the legal equivalent of directives to be used in the 
establishment of criminal penalties, precluding effects similar to those of Regulations 
under article 249 EC.
136   
 
5.  Conclusions 
The established criteria for Community penalties, derived from the Treaty
137 and 
found both in secondary legislation and judgments of the ECJ, required 'effective, 
dissuasive and proportionate penalties'.
138  Later judgments recognised the power of 
individual Member States to enact criminal law in support of Community action even 
where it was not required as a common standard across the Union and required 
Community obligations to be enforced with standards analogous to similar but purely 
national obligations.
139  The test became 'effective, dissuasive, and proportionate 
administrative or criminal penalties' to reflect this discretion of Member States to 
legislate beyond a common minimum level of protection.  With little explanation as to 
the legal basis for removing this discretion, the Environmental Legislation Litigation 
produced a new standard of 'effective, dissuasive and proportionate criminal 
penalties', removing in areas within the scope of that judgment the discretion of 
Member States to choose between administrative and criminal sanctions and therefore 
transferring this discretion to the Community legislature.
140  Having established a 
Community power to require criminal penalties, the question becomes to what extent 
the Community is entitled to prescribe specific penalties.  It is clear that where it is 
entitled to require criminal penalties, it must also have defined relevant offences.  The 
a distinction between requiring penalties of a criminal nature and providing binding, 
specific sentencing rules is substantial from the point of view of state sovereignty 
such as it is in the contemporary European context.  The guidance offered by the court 
in the Environmental Legislation Litigation extends only as to appropriate Treaty 
legal bases.  The framework decision on the whole was considered to have as its main 
purpose the protection of the environment, therefore falling within Community 
competence.  Although it defined offences and required Member States to establish 
criminal penalties, it did not provide sentencing guidelines similar to some other 
framework decisions adopted under the Union criminal law approximation 
competence such as those on narcotic substances or counterfeiting of the Euro.
141  
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  18Whilst the commission considers many of these rules also to be within its legislative 
competence, only the litigation that is sure to follow the Commission's programme of 
legislative adjustment to its newly discovered criminal competence will provide an 
answer.  To date, no such Community instrument has survived the codecision process 
to provide a basis for such a judgment. The framework decision in the Environmental 
Legislation Litigation was promulgated after the Council, comprised of 
representatives of Member States' governments, refused to assent to an identical 
directive.  A sufficient number of Member States were opposed to the directive on the 
grounds that they felt the Community had no competence to prescribe specific 
criminal penalties to preclude its passage.
142  If this is based on domestic political 
concerns, there is nothing to prevent them from thwarting Community legislation on 
the grounds that despite that Competence having been implied by the ECJ, they are 
unwilling on principle to promulgate Community criminal legislation.  This 
conclusion is supported by the difficulties encountered by recent first pillar legislative 
proposals rejected or substantially amended during the legislative process as well as 
the continuation of the legislative process for a framework decision containing 
criminal law measures combating xenophobia and racism.  Where this is the case, the 
ECJ has effectively ruled out any Union acts aimed at formally setting common 
standards for protecting the environment through criminal law.  Whenever the 
Community is unable to agree on relevant criminal law measures, enhanced co-
operation in the form of Union rules would contravene the reasoning in the 
Environmental Legislation Litigation.  In this way, the Court of Justice may 
inadvertently have limited, rather than extended, the prospects of European of 
criminal law harmonisation in the short term.  At the very least, the opportunity for 
expressing non-binding political agreement in a Union act is precluded wherever a 
Community competence for creating binding rules exists. Returning to the dichotomy 
between vertical effects on Member States and horisontal effects on individuals, some 
pre-existing legal limits bind the Community in its eventual exercise of the criminal 
competence.  The rule against direct effect for dependent legislation such as all 
directives and some relevant regulations is strong in civil law matters and appears 
even stronger where the criminal law is concerned.  There are human rights 
implications such as the rules against retrospective criminalisation which the ECJ and 
national courts are bound to take into account when considering the direct effect of 
non-dependent regulations.  Therefore it is not clear that even Regulations defining 
penalties could have direct effects on individuals notwithstanding the Commission's 
thus far unconsummated power to prescribe a detailed criminal law obligation for 
Member States to implement.  The Court has in the past rejected an opportunity to 
give indirect effect to criminal law obligations derived from Community law. 
Sympathetic interpretation is limited by general principles of Community law and its 
feasibility is ultimately left to the determination of national courts.  In its current state 
of development, the only recognised sanctions for breaching Community criminal law 
rules are against the State, not the individual.  Political disagreements during 
Community criminal legislative processes have in practice thwarted the development 
of real dialogue between the legislature and the Court of Justice on precisely where 
the balance between effectiveness and the principled limits of Community criminal 
rules lies, and how these fundamental constitutional limits of Community criminal 
law translate into practice.  
                                                 
142 Environmental Litigation Legislation, paragraph 24. 
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